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Competition in public procurement auctions in the water supply and sanitation sector is largely limited. This is partly because of high technical complexity and partly because of auction design flaws. The division of lot contracts is an important policy choice for auctioneers to achieve efficiency. In general, there is a tradeoff between competition in auctions and size of contracts. Larger works could benefit from economies of scale and scope, but large contracts might undermine competition. Using data on public procurement auctions for water and sewage projects in developing countries, this paper shows This paper-a product of the Economics Team, Finance, Economics and Urban Development Department-is part of a larger effort in the department to understand and enhance efficiency and effectiveness in public procurement for infrastructure. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at aiimi@worldbank.org. that bidder entry is crucially endogenous, especially because it is determined by the auctioneer's bundling and unbundling strategy. If water treatment plant and distribution network works are bundled in a single lot package, competition would be significantly reduced, and this adverse entry effect would in turn raise the public procurement costs of infrastructure. There is no evidence of positive scope economies in the bidder cost structure. It is important to account for the underlying cost structure for designing efficient auction mechanisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Competition is the single most important factor to contain pubic procurement costs and perhaps discourage collusive bidding behavior and corrupt practices. However, many infrastructure projects seem to continue faced with considerable difficulties to intensify competition in the procurement process (Estache and Iimi, 2008a) . This may be partly unavoidable because infrastructure projects are normally extremely valuable and highly customized.
1 However, there are still several simple measures that could potentially extend market competition but sometimes have not been exploited carefully.
The current paper revisits the problem of endogenous participation in auctions and the division into procurement lots in the water supply and sewage industry. In this sector, it is always of particular concern that the observed degree of competition has been limited. In the public-private partnership (PPP) context, less than five multinational water enterprises may have been dominant over the world (Foster, 2005) . 2 Even in the traditional public procurement context, the degree of competition is in general limited (Estache and Iimi, 2008a ).
There is a tradeoff between competition in auctions and size of contracts. Not many firms can apply for highly valuable contracts, because of financial and experiential constraints. Highly specific works (which are normally valuable as well) would also limit competition. On the other hand, infrastructure projects are normally expected to exhibit economies of scale and possibly economies of scope in preparation and implementation. Therefore, larger lot works could be procured at relatively low costs per unit, though fewer applicants may participate.
1 Estache and Iimi (2008d) discusses the interactive effects among entry, quality and competition with data from public procurement auctions for electricity projects. These elements are closely related with one another.
2 According to the Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database, the top 10 percent largest firmsdefined by the number of transactions that each company obtained-were awarded about half of total infrastructure PPP contracts. In the water industry, especially, a multinational French water service operator, Veolia Environnement (former Vivendi Environnement, or Compagnie Générale des Eaux), was alone awarded 51 contracts, and another French company, SUEZ (former Lyonnaise des Eaux), won 50 transactions in the developing world.
To enhance competition at auctions, in theory, it is an important choice for auctioneers whether to bundle or unbundle a set of relevant objects. If there are only two bidders for an arbitrary number of objects, the auctioneer should bundle all the objects to facilitate their competition against one another. Conversely, given a relatively large number of bidders, the auctioneer has a tendency to prefer to unbundle her objects (Palfrey, 1983 In practice, whether the lot (un)bundling promotes or hinders competition is crucially dependent on the cost structure of firms for producing or delivering the contracts (Grimm et al., 2006) . 4 Infrastructure procurement contracts may not be perfectly identical but often closely related to each other. Therefore, sometimes a company is able to undertake more than one public contract together, which are potentially different and could be contracted out separately. Under such circumstances auctioneers will be faced with an important choice between competition and economies of scale and scope. Given highly heterogeneous potential bidders, the unbundling strategy may be attractive because it would encourage relatively small but specialized firms to participate in the bidding process (Grimm et al., 2006) . However, the potential scale and scope effects, which would realize if a single contractor is awarded multiple components, have to be sacrificed.
Under the bundling strategy, potential economies of scale and scope can be internalized in the bidding process. Large procurement lots are expected to have relatively aggressive bids per unit. Estache and Iimi (2008a) shows that infrastructure procurement exhibits significant economies of scale in the sense that procurement costs would decrease with physical attributes of development projects. 5 At the same time, however, it cannot be ignored that the bidder entry decision is potentially affected by the size of contract. For instance, it is shown that the larger electricity generators are procured, the fewer bidders can participate (Estache and Iimi, 2008d) .
The current paper casts light on possible economies of scale in implementing infrastructure development projects. It uses data from official development assistance (ODA) projects.
Specifically, the water supply and sewage sector is analyzed where there are basically two types of main components in ordinary development projects: treatment plant, and transmission and distribution network. These may require different expertise and technical skills but sometimes are auctioned together as a single package. If economies of scope are significant, the equilibrium bid should be low for contracts involving the two types of work.
By contrast, if they are by nature too different to implement together and there is little room for economies of scope, then the bundling should bring no significant effect on bids. Rather, if only a few firms are able to implement both, the bundling approach would crucially limit bidder participation, undermining competition at the auction level.
To estimate the effect of the lot division on the bid function, it is necessary to explicitly address the endogeneity of bidder participation, rather than relying on the traditional fixed-n approach where the number of bidders is assumed fixed and commonly known by bidders. This is obvious from the above discussion. The endogenous participation problem is a complex issue in auction theory, especially when other factors are involved, such as quality requirements and joint bidding practices (e.g., see Iimi, 2008b, 2008d) . The following empirical analysis focuses on the endogeneity of the number of bidder n by the 5 For instance, the predicted procurement cost of roads per km would be about 0.5 million U.S. dollars on average, but it would be prohibitively high at more than 2 million U.S. dollars per km when less than 10 km of roads are procured. Similarly, the predicted construction cost of a water treatment plant with a capacity of 500,000 m 3 per day is about 58 U.S. dollars per m 3 . However, it will cost 200 U.S. dollars per m 3 if the procured capacity is only 100,000 m 3 per day.
zero-truncated negative binomial regression and instrumental variable techniques. The remaining paper is organized as follows: Section II describes our data on procurement auctions for water and sewage projects and develops our empirical models to estimate the equilibrium bid function with endogenous participation. Section III presents and interprets our main empirical results.
II. COMPETITION AND (UN)BUNDLING IN WATER AND SEWAGE PROJECT PROCUREMENT
The market of official infrastructure development is huge. The OECD Development
Assistance Committee ( Because of project-specific nature and institutional design of auctions, these auctions will be characterized as the independent private value paradigm in the following discussion.
7
In general, competition in public procurement auctions for infrastructure development projects is limited (Gupta, 2002; Foster, 2005; NOA, 2007) . In the water supply and sewage sector, the average number of bidders in an auction is about five. The decision about whether to bundle or unbundle treatment and distribution lots appears to impact on bidders' auction participation and their submitted bid. If a treatment plant work is auctioned separately from any distribution work, the average number of bidding firms is 5.4, and the bids relative to their engineering cost estimates would average about 1.2 (Table 1) .
Similarly, about 5.2 bidders would participate on average if only distribution network work is contracted out. The average bid is about 1.1. These look all normal. Note that the distribution of the normalized bids is centered on unity (Figure 2 ). However, when both treatment and network works are procured simultaneously, the realized bids would be much higher and the bidder entry tends to be limited. There are two possible reasons for high costs of the bundled approach, though related to one another. First the bundling might increase the entry cost for potential bidders, thus limiting participation and deteriorating auction efficiency (i.e., increasing the equilibrium bid).
According to the simple statistics in Table 1 , the number of firms that can implement both seems to be small. This would obviously explain the relatively high bids, but maybe partly.
For technical reasons, second, there might be no significant cost advantage of engaging the two different activities together. Rather, it could be more costly to internalize and coordinate them within a single company (i.e., diseconomies of scope). This might be the case if the required knowledge, skills and workers are not substitutable between the two works.
Conversely, if there are economies, it means that the observed bids would be rather higher without scope economies.
To estimate the (adverse) entry effect of bundling separately from the effect of bundling on the equilibrium bid through the underlying firm cost structure, a two-stage approach is used.
Following the earlier empirical auction literature (e.g., Porter and Zona, 1993; Gupta, 2002; Iimi, 2006; Estache and Iimi, 2008d) , the symmetric equilibrium bid of bidder i at auction j is considered:
where n is the number of participating bidders. The equilibrium function is expanded to accommodate the potential presence of economies of scope. An important simplification here is that the underlying firm cost structure is assumed to stand out in the bid function, and this is plausible under the conventional independent private value paradigm. emphasis is placed on technical considerations, the price bids would be normally higher (see Estache and Iimi, 2008d) . Project country dummy variables are also included to the possible extent. Bidders' nationalities are included in Z to control for heterogeneity across bidders.
In Equation (1), n is a potentially endogenous variable, which is determined by x's, Z and other exogenous variables W outside this system:
In an endogenous setting, auction theory suggests that there is the optimal number of bidders which equates bidders' entry costs with their expected profits when they participate (McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Levin and Smith, 1994) . Following Porter and Zona (1993), Bajari et al. (2006) and Price (2008) , two numbers are created for W: CAID is the amount of gross ODA disbursement in the water and sanitation sector that each project host country received for the three years before the award of a particular contract. WAID is similarly defined as the total ODA amount distributed to the water sector all over the developing world.
11 If firms are already engaged in a large number of similar development projects, fewer bidders would be willing to bid on further works. The aid data come from the OECD Creditor Reporting System database.
Two estimation methods are used. First, the traditional instrumental variable (IV) regression can estimate Equations (1) and (2) consistently. In addition, to see the importance of endogenous n, a truncated negative binomial model is also performed, because n is a nonnegative integer and typical of count data (e.g., Li and Perrigne, 2003; Ohashi, 2008) . It is a generalized Poisson regression model. Notably, once the endogeneity associated with n is controlled, the (static) competition effect is still expected to be affirmative in theory (i.e., agreed contract. The fact that the substantial technical evaluation system was adopted is expected to capture unobservable but systematic technical difficulties in development works. 0   ). In our data, the normalized bid appears to decrease with the number of participants in both treatment plant and network cases (Figure 3) . Our data are composed of 301 bids on 69 procurement auctions in 12 developing countries (Table 2 ). The dependent variable is the winning and losing evaluated (not read-out) bids in constant 2005 U.S. dollar terms.
12 Table 3 shows the summary statistics. The contract value varies from less than one million to 270 million U.S. dollars. The physical specifications of contracted work also widely differ. The treatment plant daily capacity could be 2,000 m 3 in some cases and 600,000 m 3 in other cases. The total length of erected pipes ranges from 5 km to 370 km, depending on contracts. 
III. ESTIMATION RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS
The truncated negative binomial regression model indicates that the bidder entry, hence the number of bidders, is endogenously determined, particularly by the size of contract (Table 4 ).
The null hypothesis that n is not affected by the explanatory variables in x's, Z and W can be strongly rejected by the chi-squared test; the conventional Wald test statistics are estimated at 14.80 and 36.27. Especially, the variables for technical specifications in x's are statistically significant. Based on the model with their quadratic terms, fewer bidders would participate in the competitive bidding for technically larger specifications. The elasticities are evaluated at mean values. Not surprisingly, this is supportive of the auctioneer's unbundling tendency toward smaller lot contracts to promote more competition in auctions.
It is also found that the bundling strategy would likely reduce bidder participation. The coefficient of is estimated at -0.005, which is negative and significant. Therefore, the expected number of participants will decline as the sizes of involved treatment plant and network works increase simultaneously. It means that the number of firms that can implement both activities seems to be limited. This is important evidence to design the procurement auctions in this sector. The extent to which potential bidders are already occupied with other development projects may have a negative impact on bidder entry, but the coefficients are largely insignificant. The IV estimation results confirm the above main findings about bidders' entry decision. The larger technical specifications are auctioned, the fewer bidders would participate. And the interactive term of treatment capacity and length of pipes has a significantly negative coefficient of -0.002 (Table 5) .
13 Therefore, the bundling strategy will harm bidder participation.
More importantly, the equilibrium bid has been found to decrease with the realized number of bidders in the IV specification, but that competition effect remains ambiguous in the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, which potentially provides biased estimates under the assumption that n is endogenous. In addition, the estimated bid function implies that there is no significant effect of economies of scope. The interactive coefficient estimated at 0.001 is far from significant in the IV regression. Interestingly enough, this term has a positive and significant coefficient of 0.004 in the OLS model. The results can be interpreted to mean that the overall impact of bundling the two components may be toward higher procurement bids and weaker market competition, as captured by the OLS estimate. However, this adverse effect can be explained largely by the entry deterrence effect resulting from bundling irrelevant works. If this entry effect is excluded, the equilibrium bid function still has the significant (static) competition effect (i.e., lower b for larger n). And there is no evidence of positive scope economies in the underlying bidder cost structure. The positive coefficient of must capture the above-mentioned endogenous negative entry effect. The above policy implication is straightforward and may be consistent with intuitions that some practitioners already have. Nonetheless, the risk inherent in the bundling strategy, which is still very often preferred by auctioneers and financial sponsors (i.e., aid agencies) for various reasons, cannot be overemphasized. It is partially true that the unbundled procurement is administratively costly for executing agencies, because they may have to 13 The models include 13 dummy variables other than those shown in the table: one for aid donors, five for project host countries, and seven for bidder nationalities. Initially, there were more dummy variables included. However, many dummies have been found statistically insignificant due to multicolinearity. Therefore, several insignificant dummy variables are omitted; the null hypothesis of these coefficients being zero cannot be rejected at the conventional significance level. The F-statistics is estimated at 1.48 for the expanded IV model. spend several times as much time as required in the turnkey procurement case. They also have to coordinate a number of small lots divided. However, our estimates indicate that the potential losses caused by this flawed bundling design could be sizable. If the truncated negative binomial regression model (the last column of Table 4 ) is evaluated at the sample means other than project capacity variables, x 1 and x 2 , the predicted number of bidders would be only 2.1 when bundled. If procured separately, the treatment and network component could attract 5 and 4.4 contenders, respectively (Table 6 ). This reduction in bidding participants from some 5 to 2 would lead to significant increases in government procurement costs according to the estimated bid function in Table 5 . With the data on public procurement auctions for water and sewage projects in developing countries, it is shown that the bidder entry is perhaps endogenous, especially influenced by the bundling and unbundling strategy of potentially different types of contracts, such as water treatment plant and distribution network works. If these two activities are bundled in a single lot package, competition would likely be curbed significantly because there may be only a few firms that can implement both works together. This adverse entry effect would in turn raise the equilibrium bid, thus pushing up public procurement costs of infrastructure. There is no evidence of positive scope economies in the underlying bidder cost structure. Therefore, there is no rationale for bundling the water treatment plant and network components.
